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Primary goal of stabilization policy in the Treaty of European Union  is price 
stability. That goal may be in conflict with the goal of full employment in the 
member states, particularly, then the union is hit by an asymmetric shock. 
Assuming perfect capital mobility an initial adverse shock (Krugman 1993) may 
have permanent effects by releasing a self-reinforcing process, which will result in 
lower relative growth. Given the specification of a model that captures the crucial 
element of efficient structural transformation it is easy to conclude the lack of 
necessary structural transformation within EMU. In addition, the basic foundation 
of economic policy by EMU, as manifested by the Treaty of European Union, is by 
latter research put into question. Therefore this paper suggest, it is necessary that 
the Treaty of European Union must be supplemented, changed, or both. 
 
 
                                                
 
 
1.   The European Monetary Union 
 
According to the Treaty of European Union (better known as the 
Maastricht Treaty) for creating European Monetary Union (EMU), a 
European Central Bank (ECB) have been established to carry out the 
common monetary and exchange rate policy, while fiscal policy   
essentialy remain a question for national governments. However, 
flexibility of fiscal policy is subject to common rules on government 
deficits and depts with the aim of ensuring budget discipline according 
to the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact.2  
EMU implies the loss of national monetary autonomy. The effects 
of monetary policy will move all the member state economies in the 
 
1 Address correspondence to R. Norén, Mid Sweden University, S-831 25 Öster-
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2 The Maastricht convergence criteria and the restictions on fiscal policy rules that 
follow is further reinforced, even with penalities on countries that fail to correct 
situations of excessive deficits and dept, by the Stability and Growth Pact. 
 
  1same directions. That implies that the supervision of monetary policy is 
a matter of common concern. Primary goal of stabilization policy in the 
Treaty on European Union is price stability. Stabilization policy to 
expand employment may produce a high and unstable inflation, and is 
inconsistent with the Treaty.3  
Change in the exchange rate or national monetary policy have 
often been useful, but now an alternative adjustment policy have to be 
provided for in EMU. To implement an active fiscal policy in the 
member states would likely conflict with the current constraints by the 
Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact. Hence, short-term 
stabilization is highly dependent on flexibility in the labour market. 
However, since labour is rather immobile within EMU,4  the EMU 
countries will have to relay on adjustment through wages to return to 
full employment. On the other hand, if capital mobility is high and 
wages cannot be adjusted, only by reducing employment the return on 
capital will be restored to keep the country attractive to investment after 
an economic shock.  
Consequently, as capital will be highly mobil in EMU a fall in the 
relative expected return on investment would lead to an outfow of 
capital. Since highly mobile capital implies the equalization of the cost 
of capital across EMU, the relative expected return on investment will 
not recover and the outflow of capital will continue. That would result 
in lower total investment. Hence, under perfect capital mobility, the 
initial adverse shock may have permanent effects by releasing a self-
reinforcing process, which will result in lower relative growth. Thus, 
external shock could have a permanent effect (Krugman 1993). 
Consider, for instance, that the ultimate origin of the shock is of a 
structural nature. The net exports are falling because the industries in 
the country are not longer able to compete on the international market 
(asymmetric shock). In a sovereign country the currency have been 
depreciated by the market, or in a country with fixed exchange rates, 
                                                 
3 To reduce the conflict between a stabilization policy to expand employment and a 
high and unstable inflation the development of a federal system (fiscal federalism) 
in EMU have been discussed. A proposal in that direction (Italianer and 
Vanheukelen, 1993)  is that the EMU countries should subsidize the national 
budgets of members states that are hit by asymmetric shocks.   
 
4 Labour mobility in Europe is low compared with USA. That is explained by 
obstacles as language barriers, social and cultural barriers that exist between the 
European countries.  
 
  2devaluated by economic policy. If not, an expansionary monetary 
policy had probably been pursued. The budget crises that will follow, in 
turn will force fiscal policy to move in a pro-cyclical direction, and the 
following slump will become aggravated.5 Thus, traditional fiscal policy 
is not possible, and above all, the union important question of economic 
structure and growth must be payed attention to.  
From this point of view, a reinforcement of the conditions for 
higher productivity and growth is necessary. Thus, economic policy 
measures to affect economic transformation will become most 
significant. The research of endogenous transformation activities is one 
important step in that direction. The result of this research,  and the 
economic policy that will follow, is for the EMU countries most 
significant because structural differences among EMU members would 
be the ultimate cause of shocks having asymmetric effects. To get better 
knowledge of structural differences, and perhaps an economic policy to 
reduce that differences, discussion of the concept of economic 
transformation in an simple equilibrium context may be useful. In other 
words, to find the conditions to achive necessary structural flexibility 
and minimize asymmetric shocks across the monetary union. 
 
 
2.   A Model of Optimal Structural Transformation 
 
With this requirement in mind, we will now add the transformation 
process to the open economy. Given the specification of a vintage 
model6, the key concept of the transformation process is the rate of 
capital rent by sector endogenously determined by the exchange rate, 
labour costs, and value added in each sector, respectively. Technically, 
the necessary transformation pressure, in order to remain in a 
continuous state of full employment, is derivable from the rate of 
domestic capital rent. In the equilibrium context, the rate of domestic 
capital rent coordinates investment and the process of deterioration 
(obsolescence) of the capital stock, and thus, the structure of the 
transformation process. 
As is well known, structural change is a continuous process, in 
which commodities and methods of production are renewed or re-
                                                 
5 For a discussion see Buti and Sapir (1998), Chapter 12. 
 
6 The model presented in this section is based on Norén (1998). 
 
  3placed all the time.7 For a country where international trade represents a 
significant proportion of the economic activity the equilibrium of the 
domestic economy is to a great extent determined by the conditions 
given abroad. Most countries are sufficiently small to take foreign 
demand as given. Against this background, a crucial factor is the extent 
to which the industry sector can adjust to changes in foreign market 
conditions. 
Stated in the preceding discussion, the problem of structural 
change has two interrelated aspects. One is the need to close down 
uncompetitive capacity. The other is the lack of expansion in poten-
tially competitive parts of industry, to be solved only by transferring 
resources from uncompetitive to more expansive sectors of the 
economy.  
However, industrial adjustment does not imply industrial trans-
formation and long-term growth effects, if the model does not incor-
porate the specification of an endogenous response in the change of the 
capital stock. The change of the capital stock is a dynamic process in a 
dual sense dismantling of old investments subject to physical or 
economic deterioration, and investment in new and more efficient 
machines brought into production. Needless to say, both components of 
this process must be taken into consideration when the effects of long-
term policy measures are under discussion. 
The exchange rate, factor prices, and the value of output are in the 
context of the transformation process important variables. Decreased 
production costs (perhaps through a innovation and/or increased 
productivity) increases competitiveness, raises the profit rates, and thus, 
there is a risk that necessary cost reductions will not be realized. Hence, 
the incentives to dismantling old investments on obsolescence diminish. 
On the other hand, a fall in relative productivity can imply, due to 
decreasing competitiveness and falling profit rates, a risk of 
exaggregated cost cuts. Anyhow, the incentives to dismantling old 
investments on obsolescence increase. These two examples are simple 
but provide a strong argument for recognizing the disinvestment 
(dismantling of capital stock) process in the economic analysis. Indeed, 
this leads to the question of finding the appropriate balance between 
                                                 
7 Here, the term structural change refers primarily to arrangements affecting the use 
of resources, and the patterns of domestic production and trade resulting from their 
allocation (structural transformation) in different sectors of the economy.  
 
  4competitiveness and an efficient transformation in the industry sector to 
sustain a desirable growth path in the economy. 
The mechanism discussed above illustrates a visible image of the 
principles of the industrial transformation process in the open economy.  
The objective is now to develop one approach that incorporates 
Salters´s (1960) notion of the vintage structure of industry sectors in the 
transformation process. Within this framework, the individual country 
is regarded as small in the union market: hence, the union market rate of 
return (operation surplus ratio)8 on production (rjU), for any industry 
and time period, is assumed exogenously fixed, that is: 
 
  rjU   =    rjUo         (1) 
 
However, the domestic operation surplus ratio, denoted rjD, is en-
dogenously determined for the industry sector in question by the ratio 
of the operation surplus9 (value added, VAj , reduced by wage costs, pjL) 
to the value added of each industry respectively, and the union 
exchange rate ER, measured as €/$. A higher value of ER implies a low 
value for €, i.e., a depreciation of €. We get: 
 
  rj




  ER      (2) 
 
Within the competitive framework of the small open economy, it is here 
assumed that financial resources are free to flow between different 
countries. Given this specification, the operation surplus ratio between 
the home country and the foreign countries in question will become 
crucial for the producer´s decision to expand production capacity, and 
likewise for financial circles to invest, domestically as well as abroad.10 
Or, to state the matter otherwise, in high-profit-rate countries 
investment will increase and thus attract funds from low-profit-rate 
countries. 
                                                 
8 Definition is given below. 
 
9 Given perfect competition, the share of marginal product of capital. 
 
10 This implies that households and firms can borrow and lend at the going interest 
rate on world capital markets. 
 
  5The discussion above has stressed that the capital stock is subject 
to physical as well as economic deterioration (obsolescence). In the 
latter case, as the capital stock gets older, the quasi-rent in the 
Marshallian sense falls and eventually becomes zero. The economic 
decision is then taken to scrap the capital object as obsolescent despite 
its continuing physical durability. Hence, in technical terms, the model 
incorporates a condition that determines the economic life of a capital 
unit. This can be shown by using the following equation: 
 
  DEPRj





      (3) 
 
where γ j represents the operation surplus ratio elasticity of sectoral ob-
solescence of capital equipment (machines) for each sector respectively 
and DEPRo
j is a constant term reflecting scrapping of sectoral capital 
equipment on obsolescence when, at equilibrium, rj  =  rj* (the initial 
operation surplus ratio). Thus, the sectoral obsolescence of capital is 
here uniquely determined by the sectoral operation surplus ratio. 
Given the union market operation surplus ratio, changes in rjD will 
not affect rjU, but it will have effects on the demand for investment (IjD) 
in the domestic country. For example, a decrease in the domestic labour 
costs leads to an increase in rjD and hence, with constant rjU, will 
increase the demand for investment in the domestic country. Given the 
small-country assumption, domestic investment will expand until 
domestic labour costs rise, and hence, decrease rjD to the level of union 
market operation surplus ratio rjU. However, investment demand is 
affected by variables other than the relative operation surplus ratio. The 
change in total activity level, the change of each country respectively 
and the need to replace the capital stock due to physical deterioration 
are two important variables.11 
Stipulated in this way, a proposition of structural equilibrium 
emerges. Labour is released from all old machines; this release and the 
growth in the total labour force is what provides the labour resources to 
operate the new vintage of machines brought into production.12 Given 
                                                 
11 The supply of funds available for investment to the particular sector, industries in 
countries with relatively increased operation surplus ratios are assumed to gain 
share at the expense of industries in other countries. 
 
12 The reader should note that the equilibrium condition (Equation 4) is stated for 
the national economy as a whole. 
  6the assumption of full employment, the transformation process is stated 
to be in equilibrium (structural equilibrium condition) when machines 
scrapped (physical deterioration and obsolescence) releases enough 
labour to operate the new and more efficient machines brought into 
production. Hence, the dual effect of variations in the operation surplus 
ratio, the key variable of the transformation process, now appears. 
The fundamental equation, constituting the necessary transforma-
tion pressure in order to remain in a continuous state of full employ-











o)      (4) 
 
Within the framework, the capital stock in use comprises machines of 
different vintages. The more recent vintages will have lower labour 
costs per unit of output, because they embody technical progress, i.e 
machines of successive vintages become more efficient with technical 
progress.13 Thus, to reflect this situation ω j
o is used to measure the rate 
(exogenously set) of technical progress embodies in machines of new 
vintages in use. 
  For instance, a decrease in domestic labour costs leads to an 
increase in rjD and hence, with constant rjU, will in the long run increase 
the demand for investment in the domestic country. In addition, the 
incentives to dismantling old investments on obsolescence diminish. As 
a consequence, the aggregated capital stock is increasing. Given the 
structural equilibrium condition (equation 4 above), domestic labour 
costs will rise, and thus decrease rjD, due to a beginning scarcity of 
labour to operate the new machines brought into production. Finally, a 
new equilibrium will be established. However, different sectors adjust 
differently, and a structural transformation between sectors will take 
place. The outcome of this transformation is a new structural profile of 
the economy (industry sectors). Technically, the necessary transfor-
mation pressure is derivable from the rjD equilibrium values. That 
transformation pressure is also optimal for the individual country then 
the expected domestic rate of return is equal to the expected rate of 
                                                 
13 The analysis envisaged here is base on the assumption of substitutability between 
capital and labour before the installation of new capital equipments but fixed labour 
requirements after installation. 
 
  7return in the union, provided price stability and full employment in the 
domestic economy as well as in the union. 
In other words, the conditions above meets the demand for the 
required conditions of necessary structural flexibility, i.e., the structural 
flexibility that is required to achive full employment and price stability 
within the union. In addition, structural flexibility is linked to produc-
tivity and growth. As we allready know, structural differences between 
the member states are the origin of asymmetric shocks. Logically, the 
growth linked to the definition of the optimal transformation pressure 
also minimize asymmetric shocks across the monetary union. 
 
 
3.   Restrictions on Structural Flexibility in EMU 
 
Wheras the rate of industrial growth in the advanced economies in 
general has been restricted by a failure to absorbe labour in expanding 
sectors, the transformation process has often been prevented by the 
unresponsiveness of the stagnating sectors to release labour. Obviously, 
the lack of transformation in the labour market, not only affect, but also 
to a great extent determine the conditions for the whole industry in the 
long run. As we know, structural change in the economy is essential to 
expected progress. If traditional labour market policy are devoted 
mainly to resisting change that will mean slower growth for the whole 
economy. In other words, labour market policy must be seen in a 
structural context and how economic growth will be affected.14 
Logically, economic policy to support capacity expansion must com-
prise both investment as well as disinvestment, because disinvestment 
and investment are both the components of the industrial transformation 
process. A natural question concerns the elaboration of an economic 
policy necessary to increase the adaptability of the domestic industrial 
sector to meet the demands for structural change.  
With a symmetrical shock the direction of changes are the same in 
all union countries. Consequently, a symmetrical decreasing demand in 
                                                 
14 The imbalances in the European economy and the discussion of the need for 
greater flexibility of resources to meet the demands for structural change is not new. 
A study by Svennilson (1954) of the economic development of Europe between the 
two world wars indicated that, in most cases, the resistance to a structural renewal, 
i.e. a structural transformation directed to investments in new technology and the 
establishment of new industries, was based not only on imperfections in the 
competitive system but also on private agreements (vested interests). 
 
  8the commodity market of the monetary union will automatically lead to 
a depreciation of the union currency, provided that the union currency is 
floating. The depreciation increases competitiveness (under normal 
conditions), raises the profit rates, and thus, there is a risk that neces-
sary cost reductions will not be realized. Hence, the incentives to 
dismantling old investments on obsolescence diminish. On the other 
hand, assume that aggregated demand in the union increases, That 
implies that money demand, and thus, interest rates tend to rise. 
Provided that the union central bank is not increasing the union money 
supply, the union currency appreciates. Due to decreasing competi-
tiveness and falling profit rates, a risk of exaggregated cost cuts appear. 
Logically, the incentives to dismantling old investments on obsole-
scence increase. These two example are simple, but provide a strong 
argument for recognizing the endogenous disinvestment process in the 
economic analysis. It is easy to see by this example that the value of the 
exchange rate has a strategic significance. In the long run a new equili-
brium will be established. However, different sectors adjust differently, 
and a structural transformation between sectors will take place. The 
outcome of this transformation is a new structural profile of the eco-
nomy. Indeed, this leads to the question of finding the appropriate 
balance between competitiveness and an efficient transformation in the 
industry sector to sustain a desirable growth path in the economy.  
Considering an asymmetric shock, a chock where only parts of the 
union will change in the same direction, the situation will become more 
serious. Once an individual country has joined the monetary union the 
national exchange rate, as an adjustment to shocks hitting the domestic 
economy, have ceased to exist. The same apply to the national money 
supply and the nominal interest rate.15  
If we assume rjD is derivied according to the specification above, 
and we have two regions, region U, which stand for the monetary union 
itself, and region 2, which stand for a arbitrary region in the monetary 
union. Assume now rUD > r2D, and capital is perfectly mobile across the 
union. Capital will move from K2 to KU, i.e., from region 2 to other 
regions in the union. Assuming constant capital-labour ratio and that 
labour is perfectly mobile. This implies that labour will move in the 
same direction as capital. In technical meaning no problem will occure. 
However, if labour is fixed the situation will be quite different. 
Unemployment vill raise togheter with a lower price of labour in region 
                                                 
15 Note, the real interest rate depends on the inflation in each region. 
 
  92, at the same time labour costs will raise in the rest of the union. A new 
equilibrium in returns (rUD  =  r2D) will be established, but with a 
significant and persistent unemployment in region 2. The only 
remaining method to use for the individual EMU region, is fiscal 
policy. However, the flexibility of EMU members to carry out fiscal 
policy at the national level is restricted by the Stability and Growth 
Pact. In addition, an increasing deficit in region 2 further restricts the 
possibility of an active fiscal policy. Thus, the initial adverse shock may 
have permanent effects by releasing a self-reinforcing process, which 
will result in lower relative growth. These are also Krugmanns (1993) 
main arguments in his critics of EMU policy arrangements. 
In assessing the discussion above, the creation of a monetary union 
in itself is not the basic problem, the main problem is EMU. At first, 
EMU is not an optimal currency area. Second, characteristic for EMU 
countries is their structural differences, both in economy and culture. 
That, of course, increase the risks of shocks having asymmetric effects. 
Finally, that the flexibility of fiscal policy is restricted by common rules 
on government deficits and depts with the aim of ensuring budget 
discipline, a policy to reach the primary goal of price stability. The final 
restriction have its origon in that the economic policy by EMU, as 
manifested by the Maastricht Treaty and carried out by the Stability and 
Growth Pact, is based on the horisontal Philips curve.  
The theoretical basis of a vertical Philips curve have been 
questioned in latter research (Akerlof, Dickens and Perry 1996, 2000). 
Compatible with these studies, estimations based on Swedish data 
(Lundborg and Sacklén 2001), shows that there exists a negatively 
sloped Phillips curve. According to their empirical work, regressions on 
quarterly data 1963-2000 and estimated inflation expectations show that 
this Phillips curve is relatively robust and that an unemployment rate of 
close two percent is consistent with an inflation target slighly above its 
present level of two percent. However, Lundborg and Sackléns 
estimations based on survey data suggest that a considerably higher 
inflation rate, of around four percent, is necessary to yield a lowest 
unemployment rate. In summary, the empirical study by Lundborg and 
Sacklén for Sweden and the studies of Akerlof, Dickens and Perry for 
US strongly suggest that different forces are at work at low inflation 
levels than at high inflation levels. Thus, that the inflation rate that 
minimize unemployment should be identical across EMU, is by this 
research objectionable.  
  10Considering the Europena labour market, most of the labour force 
in EMU can not so far be classified as mobile across different countries 
within the EMU region. To avoid the emergence of labour market 
conflicts between different regions in EMU it is important to have 
similar institutional rules within the labour market of the union. 
Subsidies to increase the competitiveness by attract investment 
recourses to a specific part of EMU may also increase a potential 
economic-political conflict, and thus, is not recommendable. But 
investment to create an equal and high level education is important, so 
is also the creation of a common labour market legalization. If that 
policy is not provided by EMU, and subsidies to attract investment 
resources to different parts of EMU is not restricted, real wage 
differentials between low and high skilled labour will increase at the 
end. The result will be transitory or permanent growth differentials 
across the EMU member states. To avoid that development, the EMU 
integration policy must be implemented, and further, must be added 
with increasing mobility on the national level to increase the 
transformation process across the EMU states. With this knowledge the 
labour markets in several advanced countries would be more flexible 
and the result would also be a better performing. Nedless to say, 
industrial concentration, measured through localization, will become an 
important issue. The issue of localization naturaly put attention to the 
importance of including disinvestment as well as investment. In the 
process to find a new equilibrium the importance of these two variables 
may vary depending on localization.  
International localization (globalization) has become important 
then structural change and transformation is under discussion, 
compared to the situation from two and three decades ago, then 
structural change was more a kind of a domestic matter. That introduce 
us to economics of scale,16 and particulaly, to that is called the New 
Economic Geography17. Economic localization is not only an analytical 
                                                 
16 When economies of scale apply at the level of the industry rather than at the level 
of the individual firm, they are called external economics. External economics can 
give rise to increasing returns to scale at the level of whole domestic industry. This 
is an important knowledge in our understanding of a geographical concentration of 
industry in a cluster of firms, and play an important role in international trade, and 
hence, structural issues. 
 
17 Two pathbreaking articles in the litterature of New Economic Geography are 
Krugman (1991), and Krugman & Venables (1995). 
 
  11concept, it is also an concept of economic policy, and economic 
transformation is the basic starting point of the formulation of that 
policy. 
In the EU region it will become important if the development 
between the members will be more inter-industrial trade, and thus to 
more geographical specialization, or more intra-industrial trade, and to 
greater similarity of industrial structures. In the first case we vill have 
greater vunerability to asymmetric shocks, in the second cast we will 
have less risk of asymmetric shocks. Anyhow, as more countries enter 
EU the possibility of asymmetric economic shocks in EMU member 
countries will raise.   
Unless labour markets become more flexible individual EMU 
countries will have a difficult time adjusting to asymmetric economic 
shocks. Since labour is rather immobile within the EMU area, wages 
should adjust to return to full empoyment. Is that scenario possible 
within EMU? The answer is no, if we only think in terms of lower 
wages, but it will become yes if we consider increasing adaptability of 
the different national economies to meet the demand for structural 
change together with an active policy to support structural trans-
formation in all EMU states. The result will be a higher and more equal 
productivity for all member countries. Hence, the effects of asymmetric 
shocks will be reduced. However, the absence of substantial fiscal 
federalism within EMU implies that the transferability of fiscal 
resources across member states to offset the economic stability loss due 
to a common EU currency, is very small.  
 
 
4.   Economic Policy Recommendations for EMU 
 
Primary goal of stabilization policy in the Treaty on European Union 
for EMU, is price stability. Change in the exchange rate or national 
monetary policy is no longer possible for the single country in the 
union. The choice for the individual member state is now fiscal policy, 
but fiscal discipline must ensure that the public-sector budget and 
public-sector dept are in accordance with the rules of Treaty of 
European Union.18 Therefore, an alternative adjustment policy have to 
                                                 
18 Or to put it in other words, The EMU member states have not abolished, but 
strongly weakened, the Keynesian element in the discussion of economic policy. 
That have further been emphasized in the Stability and Growth Pact.  
 
  12be provided for in EMU. Hence, short-term stabilization is highly 
dependent on fexibility in the labour market. From this point of view, 
economic economic transformation will become most significant. 
Therefore, a model of structural transformation (optimal transformation 
pressure) was introduced.  
The essence of the model stipulated in this paper is that the 
transformation process is endogenously determined in the model. The 
key concept of the transformation process is the domestic operation 
surplus ratio, endogenously determined by exchange rate of the union, 
labour costs, and value added in each sector respectively. Technically, 
the necessary transformation pressure, in order to remain in a 
continuous state of full employment, is derivable from the the domestic 
operation surplus ratio. In the equilibrium context, the domestic 
operation surplus ratio coordinates investment and the process of 
deterioration (obsolescence) of the capital stock, and thus, the structure 
of the transformation process. Finally, the transformation pressure is 
optimal for the individual country then the expected domestic rate of 
return is equal to the expected rate of return in the union, provided price 
stability and full employment in the domestic economy as well as in the 
union. In theory, that guarantees also necessary structural flexibilty 
within the union.  
But as stipulated above, EMU is not an optimal currency area and 
short-term stabilization is highly dependent on flexibility on the labour 
market, what unfortunately does not exist. An active fiscal policy19 is 
the only policy left to the member states, and may theoretically be a 
way out of the problem. However, to implement an active fiscal policy 
in the member states would likely conflict with the current constraints 
by the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact. Due to the 
absence of substantial fiscal federalism within the EU, constraints on 
national fiscal policy du to the Stability and Growth Pact are likely to 
be especially painfull. The recommendation concerning EMU is to go 
back to the Treaty of European union and the basic policy rules that is 
here stipulated and to confront them to the actual economic situation of 
the member states. Two main alternatives, or strategies, turn out as the 
most significant for EMU.  
                                                 
19  Fiscal policy may include corporate income taxes, investment tax credit that 
reduces the cost of capital and raises investment, and the system called investment 
fund, much like a investment tax credit during periods of recession, but revoked 
when the economy has recovered. 
 
  13Given the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact, in-
creased flexibility on European labour market is necessary. In addition, 
the EMU member states must accept fiscal federalism. Not necessary to 
rule, but to coordinate and support fiscal policy of the member states. If 
not, conflicts between members may emerge, and the credibility of the 
monetary union fails. However, if the EMU member states does not 
accept fiscal federalism, and is unable to manage the labour market to 
increase its necessary flexibility, the treaty of European union and the 
Stability and Growth Pact must be changed in a less restrictive way. In 
particular, the substance of the Stability and Growth Pact must be 
discussed in a new round of negotiations.  
These two alternatives can in political words be the choice between 
the view of centralisation of EMU economic policy matters in fiscal 
federalism, a strategy preferable by France, and the view of the strong 
independent and cooperating member states, a strategy preferable by 
Germany. That two strategies would, without no doubt, be the dominant 
alternatives in the coming discussions. To find a sustainable economic-
political strategy is now the most important question of the EMU 
member states. That strategy is necessary, so we can concentrate on the 
question of increased flexibility on the labour market, higher produc-
tivity, and thus, reduced structural differences across the EMU member 
states. As the reader very vell know, this is the only way to reduce assy-
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